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This paper studies bilateral trade in which the seller makes a hidden investment
that inﬂuences the buyer’s hidden valuation. In general it is impossible to im-
plement both ﬁrst-best efﬁcient trade and efﬁcient investment using budget-
balanced trading mechanisms. The paper fully characterizes the constrained efﬁ-
cient contracts. It is shown that the optimal tradeoff between allocative efﬁciency
andincentiveprovisionresultsinrigidityintrade,thedegreeofwhichdependson
the seriousness of the holdup problem. Sufﬁcient conditions are also provided for
full separation of buyer types to take place in optimal contracts when the holdup
problem is not too severe. The seller may overinvest relative to the ﬁrst best.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies optimal contracting for bilateral trade when a holdup problem is
present. Itispartlymotivatedbytwoapparentlyconﬂictingrequirementsforanoptimal
trading mechanism. On the one hand, since efﬁcient trade is affected by uncertainties
in demand and supply, an optimal contract needs to be ﬂexible so as to accommodate
changes in the environment. On the other hand, to motivate a party to invest in the re-
lationship the contract should offer sufﬁcient protection for investment return, which
typically calls for some rigid arrangements so as to minimize opportunistic behavior by
thetradingpartner. Inaseminalpaper,Rogerson(1992)showsthattheconﬂictbetween
ﬂexibility and rigidity does not exist if investment directly affects only the payoff of the
investor: absent an investment externality the holdup problem can be completely re-
solved and full efﬁciency can be achieved under very general information structures.
This paper instead focuses on the problem in which one party’s investment directly af-
fects the payoff of the trading partner so that an externality exists.
Speciﬁcally I study a bilateral trade model in which the seller makes a hidden in-
vestment before trade that affects the buyer’s hidden valuation of the good. The model
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generalizestheclassicprincipal-agentmodelandﬁtsmanyreal-worldapplicationssuch
as supply contracting between a downstream producer and an upstream supplier, pro-
curement contracting between a contractor and government, and the Advance Market
Commitment mechanism recently proposed by Barder et al. (2006) as a means to spur
R&D investments on vaccines for diseases concentrated in low-income countries.
The efﬁcient mechanism proposed by Rogerson fails to apply to the current set-
ting because of the externality in investment. In fact, there does not exist any budget-
balanced mechanism that can implement both efﬁcient trade and efﬁcient investment.
Thebasicreasonresemblesthatofmoralhazardinteams,thoughherethebuyerhasthe
unusualactionofreportinghertyperatherthanproducingthegood. Withtwo-sidedin-
formation asymmetry, a budget-balanced mechanism always leaves some information
rent to the buyer and prevents the seller from getting the full marginal return on invest-
ment, which given efﬁcient trade leads to inefﬁcient investment.
I fully characterize the constrained efﬁcient mechanisms; the results demonstrate
anunusuallyclearrelationbetweenrigidityintradeandtheseverityoftheholdupprob-
lem in the optimal contract. The analysis also integrates moral hazard and adverse se-
lection and highlights a driving force for optimal contracting that is different from those
in the standard models.
In the moral hazard model the primary force that shapes the optimal contract is
the tradeoff between risk sharing and incentive provision; with adverse selection, the
optimal contract is driven by the tradeoff between allocative efﬁciency and the need to
extract rent from the buyer. In contrast, the agents in the current model are risk neutral
towards income, so risk sharing is not a concern; rent extraction per se is also not a
concern because lump-sum transfers can be made at ex ante.
Instead, the present model highlights the interaction between incentive provision
and allocative efﬁciency. In one extreme case, the contract can be fully ﬂexible, so that
trade is efﬁcient for all types of buyer. But to achieve this allocative efﬁciency the con-
tract has to give most of the marginal surplus from trade to the buyer due to the need
for information revelation, leaving the seller with little incentive to invest. In the oppo-
site case, the contract can be made more rigid, which sacriﬁces some ex post allocative
efﬁciency but offers a better incentive to the seller. The optimal contract has to strike a
balance between these tradeoffs. An important yet familiar result is that it is necessary
todistorttradedownwardfromtheefﬁcientlevel; thereasonisthatreducingtradehelps
transfer the buyer’s rent to the seller and therefore improves the seller’s incentive to in-
vest. If not for this incentive reason, downward distortion would be counterproductive
as the seller can always be given lump-sum transfers in exchange for efﬁcient trade for
all buyer types.
Theinteractionbetweenincentiveprovisionandallocativeefﬁciencyresultsinsome
striking features of the optimal contract, which depend in a crucial way on the degree to
which the seller’s incentive constraint binds at the optimum. First, when the incentive
constraint binds to a low degree, i.e. the shadow price on the constraint is small, trade
is efﬁcient at the two ends of the type interval. The intuition is that reducing trade for
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for all types, and hence has no effect on the seller’s marginal return; then allocative efﬁ-
ciency dictates that trade be efﬁcient for these two types. As the shadow price increases,
reducingtradeforlow typeshasamoresigniﬁcantimpactontheseller’smarginalreturn
as it punishes the seller for bad performance by reducing the total surplus. Taking ad-
vantage of this opportunity for incentive provision, the optimal contract calls for a large
reduction in trade for types close to the bottom. Such a move however is in conﬂict
with efﬁcient trade for the lowest type because the incentive compatibility of the buyer
requires a non-decreasing trade schedule. The result is rigidity: a range of the bottom
types must be bunched together to receive the same level of trade. The rigidity can be
intensiﬁed as the shadow price increases further, to the point that a range of the bottom
types have to be excluded from trade altogether.
Moreover, if a given level of investment is implemented then a more serious holdup
problem due to changes in investment cost will cause trade to be distorted further away
from the efﬁcient level for all buyer types. As the degree of the holdup problem goes
to zero, the optimal trade schedule becomes fully ﬂexible and efﬁcient. Thus there is a
monotonic relation between trade distortion (a form of rigidity) and the severity of the
seller’s incentive constraint.
To be sure, bunching is not a new phenomenon in nonlinear pricing models. What
should be stressed here is the reason and the way it occurs in the present model. In
standard nonlinear pricing bunching occurs when the type distribution fails to pos-
sess certain sorting conditions. What is novel here is that rigidity in trade is a reﬂec-
tion of the seriousness of the holdup problem relative to the effectiveness of investment
(see Proposition 3). These factors make bunching especially easy to occur regardless of
whether the standard sorting conditions are satisﬁed. Therefore a good way of inter-
preting the results of this paper is that they identify new, empirically relevant sources of
trade distortion, and show that their effects are characterized by the degree of ﬂexibility
of the optimal trading schedule.
Relation to the existing literature
The papers closest to the current study are Schmitz (2002a) and a contemporaneous pa-
per by Hori (2006). Schmitz studies a similar model with a hidden action and hidden
information but assumes that the good is indivisible and both the investment choice
and the buyer’s type are binary. He obtains two main results: one is the important ob-
servation that full efﬁciency is impossible under quite reasonable conditions; the other
showsthattheoptimaltradescheduledisplaysthefamiliarphenomenonofefﬁciencyat
the top and downward distortion at the bottom. Hori extends the inefﬁciency result to
thecaseofcontinuousinvestmentandtypebutstillwithanindivisiblegood. Themodel
inthispaperissimilarinspiritbutmuchmoregeneral. Itaddsmorerealismtotheanal-
ysis as many bilateral trade relationships involve trading divisible goods and agents can
have general utility and cost functions. More importantly, this general treatment helps
uncoverthefundamentalforcesthatshapeoptimalcontractsinthiscanonicalcontract-
ing problem. The payoff from doing so is reﬂected in the striking features of the optimal
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The existing literature on the holdup problem relies mostly on the methodology of
incomplete contracts and the typical treatment assumes both symmetric information
and renegotiation, which naturally lead to ex post efﬁcient allocations (see the excep-
tions below). Therefore unlike the present paper, the existing studies focus exclusively
on investment incentives and do not examine the tradeoff between allocative efﬁciency
andincentiveprovision.1 AnexceptionistheaforementionedpaperbyRogerson(1992),
which studies a general version of the holdup problem in a complete contracts frame-
work and shows that full efﬁciency can be achieved under broad information structures
if both investment externalities and renegotiation are ruled out.2 The current paper dif-
fersfromRogersonbyfocusingoncooperativeinvestment,whichwasﬁrststudiedinbi-
lateraltradebyCheandHausch(1999)undertheassumptionofincompletecontracting.
Investment externalities are common in bilateral relationships, including the clas-
sic principal-agent problem where the agent’s action affects the proﬁts of the principal.
The model in the current paper generalizes the principal-agent model: in addition to
the hidden action of the agent the principal privately observes how valuable the out-
put is, and on top of that the two parties also choose the level of trade. A related paper
along this line is MacLeod (2003), which studies employment contracting with private
evaluation. The focus of MacLeod’s analysis however is on wage contracts rather than
trade; indeed, inhismodelthetradelevelisasimplezero-onechoiceasitconcernsonly
whether or not the agent works for the principal.
The analysis of the current paper is clearly related to the existing literature on non-
linear pricing and screening.3 One salient feature of the optimal trade schedule in this
paperisthatitismuchhardertoachievefullseparationoftypesthaninstandardscreen-
ing models: sorting conditions on type distributions are no longer sufﬁcient and rigidity
in trade in the form of bunching is an optimal response to the holdup problem. This
particular source of trade distortion identiﬁed in the current paper differs from those
identiﬁed elsewhere in the literature. For instance, risk aversion is singled out as a fac-
tor by Salanié (1990, 1997). In contrast, the agents in the current model are risk neutral,
which leads to a ﬁrst-best contract in Salanié’s model. Some other sources of rigidity
in trade include multidimensional types (see Armstrong 1996, Rochet and Choné 1998,
Jullien 2000, and Rochet and Stole 2002), countervailing incentives of the agent when
reporting private information (Lewis and Sappington 1989), and limited enforcement
of contracts (Levin 2003). By identifying a novel source of rigidity in trade, this paper
complements these other studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model
and proves the inefﬁciency result. Section 3 formulates the main program. Section 4
characterizes the constrained efﬁcient mechanisms and discusses their many implica-
tions. Section 5 offers a numerical algorithm and a computed example. Section 6 il-
lustrates possible overinvestment. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
appendices.
1For some earlier work, see Williamson (1979), Grout (1984), and Hart and Moore (1988).
2See also Konakayama et al. (1986) and Schmitz (2002b). The former studies a special case of the model
of Rogerson; the latter shows that efﬁciency can still be achieved even if certain types of renegotiation are
allowed.
3See Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 89
2. The model
Consider a seller and a buyer who are interested in trading a divisible good. The se-
quence of events unfolds according to the following time line.
time 0 1 2 3 4
contract seller invests a buyer learns buyer selects delivery of x
signed cost g(a) type  (x,t) cost c(x), transfer t
At date 0, the agents sign a trading contract. The contract speciﬁes a menu of
quantity–payment pairs (x,t) from which one pair will be selected in the future. Note
that x can also be interpreted as the quality level of the good. At date 1, the seller pri-
vatelychoosesanactionorinvestmentlevela fromsomefeasiblesetA atthecost g(a).
The purpose of such an investment is to improve the value of the good to the buyer and
hence is cooperative. For instance the investment may create a prototype that demon-
strates the functionalities of the good designed exclusively for the buyer. At date 2, after
reviewing the prototype the buyer forms a valuation of the good, which is her private
information. Exantethebuyer’s valuationtype isstochasticandis distributedonaset
 according to a distribution function F(,a). At date 3, the buyer, now having learned
her type, chooses from the contract menu a speciﬁc quantity–payment pair (x,t). At
date 4, the seller produces the requested quantity x at the cost c(x), delivers the goods
to the buyer, and collects the payment t from the buyer. Finally the buyer obtains a
payoff equal to u(,x) t and the seller obtains a payoff equal to t  c(x)  g(a).
To summarize, both the seller’s investment choice a and the buyer’s type  are their
privateinformationrespectively;thestructureofthemodel,includingthecostfunctions
g, c, the utility function u, and the probability distribution F, is common knowledge. I
make the following assumptions on preferences and technology.
Assumption 1. The set of feasible trade levels is X =[0,1) and the set of possible buyer
types is  = [,]  R+. For each type , the utility function u(,) : X  ! R+ is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave, with u(,0) = 0. For all
 >0 and x >0, u(,x)>u(0,x), i.e. higher type is associated with higher valuation.
Assumption 2. The feasible investment levels are contained in the set A = [a,a]  R+.
The seller’s investment cost function g : A ! R+ and production cost function c : X !
R+ arebothtwicecontinuouslydifferentiable,strictlyincreasing,andconvex; moreover,
c(0)=0, limx!1c0(x)=1, g(a)= g 0(a)= g 00(a)=0, g 0(a)=1.
An allocation in this environment is an investment choice a and a rule (x,t) :  !
X  R that speciﬁes a trade x() and transfer t() for each buyer type . I focus on
deterministic contracts. By the Revelation Principle, one can focus on allocations that
areincentivecompatible, i.e.thebuyerhasanincentivetoreporthertypetruthfullyand
the seller ﬁnds it optimal to choose the assigned investment choice.
Given that the agents’ preferences are quasi-linear, the ﬁrst-best allocations max-
imize the expected total surplus from trade. Speciﬁcally, for each buyer type  a ﬁrst-
bestefﬁcienttrade xE()maximizesthejointsurplusu(,x) c(x); givenefﬁcienttrade,90 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)




The ﬁrst question is whether there exists a transfer schedule t :  ! R such that the
efﬁcient trade xE :  ! X and efﬁcient investment aE can be implemented simultane-
ously, namely whether (xE,t) and aE satisfy the buyer’s truth-telling constraint
u(,xE()) t()¾u(,xE(^ )) t(^ ) 8, ^  2









The following proposition shows that the answer in general is negative.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–2 are satisﬁed and aE is an efﬁcient invest-
ment choice in the interior of A. Let  = f 2  j xE() > 0g. Assume that  has posi-
tive measure that is not concentrated on a single point. Assume also that Fa(,aE)¶0 for
all  2  and the inequality is strict on a subset of  that is of positive measure. Then
there does not exist a budget-balanced incentive compatible mechanism that implements
aE and xE(), for all .
The main hypothesis of the proposition is that F satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance condition (Fa(,aE) ¶ 0) for buyer types that really matter (receiving pos-
itive trade), which means it is costly to produce (stochastically) better outcomes. This
ensures that there is some minimal tension between efﬁciency and incentive provision;
otherwise the seller’s incentive is trivial and efﬁciency clearly is possible. Proposition 1
covers a variety of situations with general distributions of buyer type, which can be con-
tinuous, discrete, or mixtures of the two.
Thereasonfortheinefﬁciencyhingesuponthemarginaleffectsofinvestmentonthe
agents’ payoffs. The intuition is as follows. Due to information asymmetry, the buyer
necessarily enjoys some information rent if more than one type needs to be served in
the efﬁcient allocation. In particular incentive compatibility requires that the buyer’s
rent be strictly increasing in her type. Then it follows that an increase in the investment
level must raise the buyer’s payoff because higher investment improves the distribution
of buyer’s type. At the efﬁcient investment level, the social marginal beneﬁt equals the
seller’s marginal cost of investment. Since the buyer gets positive marginal beneﬁt from
investment, the seller’s marginal beneﬁt has to be less than his marginal cost, which
of course is not incentive compatible as the seller can increase his payoff by slightly
cuttingbacktheinvestment. Inessence, fullefﬁciencycannotbeachievedbecausewith
a balanced budget the seller cannot receive the full marginal return on investment. This
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served in the efﬁcient allocation, as found by Schmitz (2002a); in that case the buyer’s
rent is constantly zero so the seller’s objective coincides with the social objective.
Notethattheinefﬁciencyresultobtainedhereisforexantecontractinganddoesnot
rely on interim participation constraints. This differs from the Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) theorem, in which inefﬁciency is caused by the incompatibility between
efﬁcient trade and voluntary participation by all types of the agents.4
Also, it should be stressed that three ingredients of the model, asymmetric infor-
mation, balanced budget, and cooperative investment, are all responsible for the inef-
ﬁciency, and it is not too hard to ﬁnd mechanisms that restore full efﬁciency if one of
these assumptions is relaxed.
The next few sections characterize the constrained efﬁcient contracts. For this pur-
pose,thefollowingadditionalassumptionsaremadethroughouttherestoftheanalysis.
Assumption 3. For each a 2 A, the distribution function F(,a) has a continuous den-
sity f (,a) on [,]. Both F and f are continuously differentiable in a, and the partial
fa(,a) is continuous in .
Assumption 4 (Single-Crossing). Forall,0 2with >0 andforallx 2X,ux(,x)
ux(0,x). In the differentiable case, this condition becomes: for all  2  and for all
x 2X, ux(,x)0.
Assumption 5 (FSD). For all a 2 A and all  2 , Fa(,a)  0, i.e. for a > a0, F(,a)
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F(,a0).
Assumption 6 (CDFC). For all a 2A and for all  2, Faa(,a)0.
Assumption 4 is used in most of the adverse selection literature, which requires that
the marginal utility of the buyer be monotonically increasing in type. Assumption 5 is
weaker than the following Assumption 7 but is sufﬁcient for some of the results. As-
sumption 6, called convexity of distribution function condition, and also used in the
moral hazard literature, roughly speaking requires that the marginal return of invest-
ment be diminishing as investment increases.5
Assumption 7 (MLRP). For all a 2A, (d=d)(fa()=f ())>0.
Thisassumption,themonotonelikelihoodratioproperty,isfamiliarinthemoralhaz-
ard literature. The speciﬁc form given in Assumption 7 is due to Milgrom (1981), who
also shows that MLRP implies FSD.
Assumption 8. The utility function u(,x) satisﬁes ux ¶0 and uxx ¾0.6
4Also see Laffont and Maskin (1979). McAfee (1991) and McKelvey and Page (2002) extend the Myerson–
Satterthwaite theorem to the case of divisible goods, but without investment.
5See Salanié (1997) for further discussions of these assumptions.
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Assumption 8 is not necessary but simpliﬁes the analysis. In particular, if the func-
tion u is separable (u = ()y(x) with 0  0, y 0  0 and y 00  0), then the analysis still
goes through even though uxx 0.7
3. Formulating the problem
In this quasi-linear environment, state-independent transfer payments from one agent
to the other do not affect either agent’s incentive. Therefore a budget-balanced con-
strained efﬁcient (or simply optimal) mechanism should maximize the expected total
surplus subject to the incentive constraints. The agents’ relative bargaining power de-
termines how the surplus should be split between them via lump-sum transfers but it
does not affect the “shape” of optimal contract.










f (,a)d   g(a) subject to








f (,a0)d   g(a0) (ICS)
where (ICB) and (ICS) are the incentive constraints of the buyer and seller respectively.
Note that there is no need to include ex ante participation constraints in the program
as they can easily be satisﬁed by means of an upfront transfer provided that the optimal
total surplus exceeds the sum of the agents’ reservation utilities.8
The combination of hidden information and hidden action in Program (P1) cre-
ates some difﬁculties in solving the problem: the usual integration-by-parts and point-
optimization techniques used to solve the standard hidden information models cannot
be applied directly. To overcome these difﬁculties, I follow an approach adapted from
Rogerson (1985) and proceed as follows. First, via a series of simpliﬁcations of the in-
centive constraints, Program (P1) is transformed into a relaxed program. Second, the
relaxed program is solved using general optimal control methods that directly incorpo-
rate the incentive constraints. Finally, I show that a solution to the relaxed program is
7This is because one can deﬁne   () as type and y  y(x) as trade level, and deﬁne a new cost
functionC(y)=c(y  1(y)),whichisstrictlyconvex. Themodelisthentransformedintolinearform: u =y,
which satisﬁes Assumption 8.
8As a contrast and for later reference, the problem of a monopolistic seller offering a proﬁt-maximizing






subject to (ICB) and u(x()) t()¾v for all , where v is the interim reservation utility of the buyer. This
is the relevant problem if the contract is signed after investment.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 93
in fact also a solution to the original program. Throughout the paper I focus on con-
tracts (x,t) that are piecewise continuously differentiable.9 This is to be consistent with
the assumptions of the main theorems in optimal control theory (e.g. Leonard and Long
1992) on which the subsequent analysis draws heavily.10
To derive the relaxed program, I ﬁrst characterize the buyer’s information rent using
standard arguments. By incentive compatibility, a type- buyer maximizes her utility
u(,x(^ )) t(^ )byreportinghertruetype ^  =,whichleadstotheﬁrst-ordercondition
ux(,x())x0() t 0()=0. (1)
By the envelope theorem, the buyer’s rent changes at the rate u(,x) as the type 
changes. In particular, relative to each , every type above  must receive the same
additional rent u(,x)d as type  +d does. Given the measure of such types, the
extra rent accrued to the types above  equals u(,x())(1 F(,a))d. Adding up all














d   g(a). (2)











Appendix B explains in detail how this formulation is derived. The idea can be sum-
marized as follows. First, one needs to focus only on the trade schedule x and the in-
vestment level a when solving the problem because the transfer schedule t() is com-
pletely pinned down (up to a constant) by the buyer’s incentive constraints once the
9A piecewise C 1 function admits derivatives except at a ﬁnite set of points, where left and right deriva-
tives exist. Such a function therefore must be continuous.
10This treatment is without loss of generality when an optimal contract exists in the piecewise C 1 class:
the surplus achievable using an arbitrary implementable contract can be approximated by piecewise C 1
implementable contracts and hence an optimal piecewise C 1 contract is optimal overall. An optimal con-
tract can be discontinuous in bilateral trade models in which the good is indivisible and the total surplus
is linear in the trade level (e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983); there an optimal contract does not exist
within the piecewise C 1 class. I assume that an optimal piecewise C 1 contract exists in the present model.
SeeGuesnerieandLaffont(1984)foraproofoftheexistenceresultwhenthereisnoinvestment; thesurplus
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trade schedule is solved. Second, by a standard argument the buyer’s incentive con-
straint (ICB) can be replaced by the monotonicity condition in (3), as the latter is nec-
essary and sufﬁcient for the former. Third, following Rogerson (1985), the seller’s in-
centive constraint (ICS) is relaxed to the condition dR(a)=da  0. The intuition is that
at the seller’s optimal choice a > a, his marginal return from investment is necessar-
ily nonnegative (otherwise he should decrease a). The reason for relaxing (ICS) to this
inequality rather than the usual ﬁrst-order condition dR(a)=da = 0 is to ensure a non-
negative multiplier on the new constraint, which will become clear in the next section.
The next lemma shows that one can indeed work with Program (P2) for the nontrivial
situation where investment is above the minimum level a, which is assumed to be the
case for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1–6 are satisﬁed. Then every solution (x,a) to Program
(P2) with a >a is also a solution to (P1). If such a solution to (P2) exists, then an alloca-
tion (x,a), where a >a, solves (P1) if and only if it solves (P2).
The logic may be explained as follows. Note that every a > a satisfying the seller’s
original incentive constraint a 2 argmaxa02A R(a0) in (P1) also satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition dR(a)=da  0 in (P2) but the reverse is not necessarily true. Therefore if
(x,a) with a > a solves (P2) and satisﬁes the constraints of (P1) then it also solves
(P1).
4. Main results
In this section I characterize the optimal contract by solving Program (P2). I proceed by
identifying the basic forces in the present model that shape the optimal contract. The
key for motivating the seller to make the necessary investment is to offer him a payoff
t() c(x()) that is sufﬁciently upward-sloping as a function of . By (1), the slope of
the seller’s payoff function can be written as the product of the marginal surplus from
trade, ux  c0(x), and the slope of the trade schedule x0():
t 0() c0(x)x0()=(ux(,x()) c0(x))x0(). (5)
This result offers a simple intuition for why full efﬁciency cannot be achieved in this
model. Since the marginal surplus ux   c0(x) equals zero when trade is efﬁcient, it is
immediate from the above equation that the seller’s payoff is independent of  if trade
is always efﬁcient; then the seller of course has no incentive to invest.
More importantly, observe from (5) that to motivate the seller we need to make the
trade schedule steep and keep the marginal surplus high. These considerations result in
downward distortion in trade, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. SupposeAssumptions1–5aresatisﬁed. If (x,a)isasolutiontoProgram
(P2), then x() is less than or equal to the efﬁcient trade level, xE(), for all  2.
This result may look similar to the downward distortion result in standard nonlinear
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hazard constraint that makes any upward distortion counterproductive; hidden infor-
mation alone does not cause any distortion at all.11 Because of this, the argument for
Proposition 2 relies on a global approach rather than the typical approach using local
ﬁrst-order conditions. Speciﬁcally, by (5) any upward distortion in trade generates a
corresponding decreasing segment in the seller’s payoff function, which has a negative
effect on the seller’s incentive. Such a “lump” in the trade schedule can be removed by
restoring trade to the efﬁcient level, which relaxes the seller’s incentive constraint and
also keeps intact the monotonicity constraint on the trade schedule, thus resulting in a
genuine increase in total surplus.
Due to the nonstandard constraints, general optimal control methods are needed to
solve Program (P2). Below I outline the basic results of the analysis and leave most of
the technical details to Appendix C.
I deﬁne =dx=d as the control variable. The state variables include trade level x,
investmentlevela,andanauxiliaryvariablethathandlestheintegralconstraint(4). The
costate variables associated with the three state variables are respectively , , and .
The variable  deserves some explanation as it plays an important role in the char-
acterization. It is the multiplier on the constraint dR(a)=da ¾ 0. As such it reﬂects
the shadow price of relaxing this constraint. In particular, we can imagine that the con-
straint is of the form dR(a)=da + ¾ 0 where  measures the change in the seller’s
marginal return from the use of a technology that adds a linear component a to the
seller’s total return. Of course,  = 0 in the current problem. But if a technology with
 > 0 is available, at the optimal allocation how much would the social planner be will-
ing to pay for a one-unit increase in ? The answer is .
When solving for the optimal contracts, it is useful to think of the solution as be-
ing obtained in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, an optimal trade schedule x is solved for
each given investment level a; in the second stage, the optimal investment level a is
determined. In Appendix C, I show that the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a
trade schedule x along with the costate variables () and  2 R to maximize the ex-
pected total surplus while implementing the investment level a (or an arbitrary level a

























11The optimal contract simply demands the seller to invest at the efﬁcient level and give the buyer the
right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer after her type is realized. The buyer offers to trade at the efﬁcient
level.96 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
For the rest of the analysis in this section, I maintain Assumptions 1–4 and 6–8, and
also assume ux(,0) < 1 and ux(,0) < 1. These latter technical assumptions are
made to avoid setting an unbounded value for the costate variable  when x = 0 and
are not as restrictive as they may seem. For instance if u = y(x) with y 0(0) = 1 we can
redeﬁne y as the quantity and transform u into a linear function.12
As it turns out, the characterization of optimal contracts depends crucially on
whether and where the monotonicity constraint dx=d  0 binds. When the mono-
tonicity constraint binds at a type , the trade schedule x may have to involve bunch-
ing, i.e. there is a neighborhood O of  such that all types in the set O \ receive the
same level of trade. If bunching does not occur at  then the complementary slackness
condition (6c) implies that  = 0 in a neighborhood of , which by (6a) leads to the
following observation.





This equation has the following interpretation. The optimal contract must balance
thetradeoffbetweenmaximizingtotalsurplusandprovidingthesellerwithanadequate
incentive to invest. For each type , increasing the trade level x() by a small amount





Increasing x also affects the expected total surplus through its impact on the seller’s
incentive. This can happen in two ways. First, the rent of all buyer types above
 is increased by ux(1   F(,a))dx, which reduces the seller’s marginal return by
 uxFa(,a)dx. This is called the rent-shifting effect. Second, the change in total sur-
plus directly affects the seller’s marginal return by (ux(,x) c0(x))fa(,a)dx, which
may be called the surplus effect. Since  is the shadow price of relaxing the constraint on






Equation (7) says that when there is no bunching, slightly adjusting the trade level x()
should have zero ﬁrst-order effect on the optimal value, i.e. the above effects sum to
zero.
Equation(7)reinforcestheearlierargumentthatthebuyer’sinformationrentcauses
an efﬁciency loss only through its effect on the seller’s incentive constraint. If the seller’s
incentiveconstraintislessstringent,i.eissmall,thentheeffectoftheinformationrent
is small and vanishes when =0.
12The appeal of the Inada condition ux(,0) = 1 is to ensure an interior solution, which it however fails
to deliver in the present model. By (8) or (10), even if ux(,0) = 1 trade may still be zero as ux(,0) can
also be 1. The reason is that although for a given type the gain from a small amount of trade dx is of
a higher order of magnitude, its incentive cost is also proportionally large. Think of u = 
p
x, which is


















Figure 1. Trade schedules
The interaction between the seller’s incentive problem and the buyer’s self-selection
shapes the optimal contract and leads to several features of the optimal trade schedule
that are striking when compared with the standard models of screening/self-selection
with hidden information.
Proposition 3. In a solution (x,a) to Program (P2), trade is efﬁcient at the top: x()=
xE(), and generically either (i) there is no distortion at the bottom: x() = xE(), or
(ii) there is bunching and even exclusion of trade for a range of the bottom types.
To better understand these features, it is essential to trace out the effects of different
values of the shadow price  on the optimal trade schedule. Consider ﬁrst the case in
which  is small. Then the solution to (7), denoted by ^ x, should be close to the efﬁcient
schedulexE andhenceshouldbenondecreasingin giventhatxE isstrictlyincreasing;







The wedge uxK() between marginal utility ux and marginal cost c0(x) of course
explains why optimal trade generally deviates from the efﬁcient level. Recall the incen-
tiveeffectsofasmallreductionintradefortype andobservefromtheaboveequations
that the wedge between ux and c0(x) is the rent-shifting effect  uxFa() multiplied by
the term =(f +fa).
Moreover, note that the rent-shifting effect is equal to zero at the two end types 
and ; the reason is that changing the trade level of each end type shifts a constant
amount of rent from the buyer to the seller for all , which of course has no effect on98 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
the seller’s marginal return. Absent this effect, the wedge between marginal utility and
marginal cost disappears and the optimal trade simply maximizes the weighted surplus
(u(,x) c(x))(f +fa). Theresultisefﬁcienttradeaslongas f +fa >0,whichisalways
trueatthetopandistrueatthebottomaswellwhenissmall. Theoutcome,illustrated
by curve a in Figure 1, is a trade schedule stretched downward from the efﬁcient curve
xE with its two ends ﬁxed at the efﬁcient points A and B. This logic works ﬁne as long
as  is small.
As the shadow price  increases, the wedge K() increases as well as long as it re-
mains positive (below I discuss what happens when it is negative), implying a greater
need to reduce the trade level. Intuitively, a higher shadow price makes increasing the
seller’s marginal return more attractive, thus making it proﬁtable to shift more rent from
the buyer to the seller through a reduction in the trade level.
This downward pressure on trade however is not uniform across all buyer types.
Speciﬁcally, of the two incentive effects brought about by a reduction in the trade level,
the rent-shifting effect is always positive but the surplus effect is not. In particular, a de-
crease in surplus for lower types where fa() < 0 has a positive effect on the seller’s
marginal return and hence improves his incentive, but a decrease in surplus for the
higher types where fa() > 0 has a negative effect on the seller’s marginal return and
thus hurts his incentive. The intuition is that punishing the seller for bad performance
is good for his incentive but punishing him for good performance is not (a reduction
in surplus is a punishment for the seller because his payoff equals the surplus minus
the buyer’s rent). Therefore, the two incentive effects of downward trade distortion are
mutually reinforcing at low types but are countervailing at high types. This difference is
reﬂected in the wedge uxK(): the rent-shifting effect  uxFa() is ampliﬁed at lower
types but is subdued at higher types through the factor f ()+fa(). Moreover, within
thereinforcingregionthetwoeffectsarestilluneven: therent-shiftingeffectequalszero
at the left end  and the surplus effect vanishes at the right end where fa = 0. As a re-
sult,thecombineddownwardpressureontradeisstrongestsomewhereinthemiddleof
the reinforcing region. A higher shadow price  only ampliﬁes this unevenness, making
downward distortion especially pronounced in the lower portion of the trade schedule.
As  increases, this downward force eventually becomes strong enough that the
trade curve, with its two ends ﬁxed at the efﬁcient points, becomes (asymmetrically)
U-shaped and a portion of it is stretched below the left and lower end (see curve b). At
that moment, the monotonicity constraint dx=d 0 is violated at the lower end of the
curve so bunching must occur. It is clear from this process that this type of bunching
can occur only at the bottom rather than the top of the type space because the highest
type always trades more goods than the other types.
For even more severe incentive problems, part of the trade curve is stretched down
to the horizontal axis and bunching occurs at zero quantity, i.e. there is exclusion of
trade for a range of the bottom types (curve c). This is easy to see when  exceeds the
threshold  f ()=fa(); then for  close to  the left-hand side of (7) is less than zero for
all x 2 (0,xE()), which means that any increase in trade up to the efﬁcient level always
has a negative marginal effect on the objective function. Therefore optimal trade is zero
for such bottom types.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 99
Observe that in this process there is no need to distort the trade level of the highest
type and it is not optimal to distort the trade level of the lowest type unless bunching
is necessary. Furthermore, the fact that the optimal trade schedule x meets the strictly
increasing efﬁcient schedule xE at the highest type  implies that bunching never hap-
pensatthetop: thecurvex hastobestrictlyincreasingnearthepoint becauseother-
wise that part of x is above the efﬁcient curve xE, which is impossible by Proposition 2.
It should be emphasized that the type of bunching characterized in Proposition 3
does not depend on special sorting conditions (or lack thereof) on the probability dis-
tribution of the buyer’s type, but rather on the strength with which the seller’s incentive
constraint binds at the optimum. This differs from standard nonlinear pricing, where
full separation can be obtained if appropriate sorting conditions are imposed.
Bunching at a nonzero quantity for the lower types amounts to a minimum pur-
chase commitment: regardless of the realized type the buyer commits to the purchase
of a minimum quantity at a preset price. In practice a minimum purchase commit-
ment can offer the ﬁrm some insurance for its R&D investments. But one may wonder
whether a more ﬂexible trade schedule can enhance efﬁciency in trade and also offer
better incentive for the ﬁrm to invest. The analysis here suggests that although the exact
level of the minimum quantity may vary, the qualitative feature is robust as long as the
incentive problem is sufﬁciently severe.
To illustrate the results of Proposition 3, consider the following example adapted
from Rogerson (1985).







This distribution satisﬁes MLRP and CDFC. Moreover, since fa()=f () =  1,13 in
any optimal solution the shadow price  exceeds  f ()=fa() = 0. By the preceding
analysis in this case a range of the bottom types must be excluded from trade. In con-
trast, full separation is possible in the standard nonlinear pricing model with this same
distribution. 
In general, due to the complex nature of the optimal contract it is difﬁcult to obtain
conditions on the primitives that foretell the occurrence of bunching; in the next sec-
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Once the optimal trade schedule is determined, the transfer schedule can be ob-





where t () is a constant and should be chosen appropriately to satisfy any ex ante par-
ticipation constraints. The transfer schedule should have the same bunching regions as
the trade schedule. It is steeper than the ﬁrst-best transfer schedule, at least for higher
types. This can be seen from t 0()=ux x0(): downward distortion in trade increases
the marginal utility ux and also makes the trade schedule steeper near the highest type,
thus raising the slope of the transfer schedule.
The analysis so far has highlighted the bunching of some bottom types due to the
seller’s incentive problem. It turns out that bunching in other parts of the type space
is also hard to rule out. Indeed, compared with standard nonlinear pricing it is much
harder to get even limited separation of types in the present model. The reason can
be illustrated as follows. In the standard nonlinear pricing model, if one ignores the










is the familiar hazard rate. Compared with (8), the difference between the two models
lies in the terms K() and 1=h().
To determine whether bunching is necessary at some point , the routine analy-
sis is to totally differentiate (8) and then see if the sign of dx=d can be determined.
The result, (C.15) in Appendix C, shows that the solution is nondecreasing at the point
 if K 0()  1. By the same token, the schedule xm is nondecreasing at the point 
if d(1=h)=d  1. While this latter condition can be easily guaranteed by an increas-
ing hazard rate, the condition K 0()  1 is hard to ensure without knowing the shadow
price .
To delineate the factors that determine the occurrence of bunching in the present
model, I introduce two measures that capture the effects of investment on the type dis-
tribution. First, let S() = 1   F() be the survival function, which is the probability
of (e.g. a machine) surviving at least up to “time” .15 Then the event density f () is
the likelihood of the bad event (machine failure) occurring per unit of time. Deﬁne the










14One may derive this from Program (M) in footnote 8.
15Thedependenceofthesefunctionsona issuppressed,whichisdonewhenevernoconfusioncanarise.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 101



















As in standard nonlinear pricing, the hazard rate h captures the effect of hidden
information. But now there is a new moral hazard effect captured by the second term.
This decomposition sheds light on the reason why it is hard to separate different buyer
types in the current model. Even if one assumes both an increasing hazard rate and
MLRP so that the denominator of K() is strictly increasing in , the bound on K 0() is





because "s ¾ "f by MLRP.16 Therefore, it is not surprising that bunching is hard to
prevent in the present model.
Nevertheless, the next proposition provides sufﬁcient conditions to rule out any
bunching other than that occurring at the bottom of the type distribution as charac-
terized in Proposition 3. Under these conditions there is room for separating different
buyer types when the seller’s incentive problem is not too severe. A striking feature of
these conditions is that they are much more stringent than the typical sufﬁcient condi-
tions for full separation to occur in the standard screening models.
Proposition 4. Suppose f 0 ¾ 0, f 0
a ¾ 0, f 00 ¾ 0, and f 00
a ¾ 0.17 Then an optimal trade
schedule takes one of the following forms.
(a) Full Separation: there is full participation and full separation of all types.
(b) Partial Exclusion: there is some 0 2 (,) such that x() = 0 for  2 [,0] and
there is participation and full separation for  2(0,].
(c) Partial Pooling: there is some 0 2 (,) such that x() = x() > 0 for  2 [,0]
and there is full separation for  2(0,].
Proposition 4 and Proposition C.1 in the appendix are also useful for computing the
optimal contracts, which is important as the model in general is difﬁcult to solve analyt-
ically.18 The results of Proposition 4 provide techniques for identifying the critical point
0 when bunching is present.
16By MLRP, for all  0 > , fa( 0)f ()  f ( 0)fa(). Integrating out  0 over the range [,] yields
f ()( Fa()) fa()(1 F()).
17Primes denote (partial) derivatives with respect to .























The current model Standard nonlinear pricing
Figure 2. Optimal trade schedules
The ﬁnal result of this section aims to isolate the effect of the seller’s incentive con-
straint on optimal trade. To prepare for this result, suppose that we want to implement
some given investment level a > a while maximizing total surplus. The previous analy-
sis of optimal trade was carried out at the optimal investment level, but the character-
izations clearly apply to the current problem of maximizing total surplus while imple-
menting a ﬁxed level of investment. What happens to the optimal trade schedule if the
investment cost g(a) changes? An important observation from (8) is that for a given in-
vestment level a any change in the investment cost function g affects the optimal trade
schedule x only through its impact on the shadow price . Thus, by holding a constant
we can focus on changes in optimal trade thatare purely due to changes in the incentive
problem without introducing effects related to changes in distribution F(,a).
Proposition 5. Considerimplementingsomegiveninvestmentlevel a forﬁxedfunctions
u, c and F. Let changes in the investment cost function g correspond to shadow prices
0 >  > 0 in the optima; then the optimal trade schedules satisfy x(;0)  x(;) for
all .
Thus, although the optimal trade level may go up or down following a change in the
investment cost, it must change in the same direction across all . Also, since the efﬁ-
cienttradeschedulexE isﬁxedandtheconstrained-optimalschedulesatisﬁesx(;)
xE forall>0,thisresultimpliesthatamoresevereincentiveproblemleadsto(weakly)
more distortion in trade for all buyer types. To the extent that ex post distortion reﬂects
a form of rigidity, Proposition 5 demonstrates a general positive relation between the
seriousness of the seller’s incentive problem and the rigidity in optimal trade.
5. An example and an algorithm
This section offers an algorithm for numerically solving the model. An example is com-
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  Figure 3. Optimal trading schedules in Example 2.
Example 2. Assume F(,a) = a(   )2 + (1  a)(   ) where  2 [, =  + 1] and
a 2 [0,1]. Note that the distribution F is a mixture of the uniform distribution and a
distribution that stochastically dominates the uniform distribution. The investment a
shifts more weight from the uniform distribution to the better distribution. We also
assume a linear utility function u = x, a quadratic cost function c(x) = x2=2, and an
investment cost function g(a) = k (1=(1 a) 1 a), where k > 0 is a parameter. Note
that g(0)= g 0(0)=0 and g(1)= g 0(1)= g 00(1)=1. The ﬁrst-best trade is simple: xE()=
. This example satisﬁes all the assumptions. Moreover, we have
f =2a(  )+1 a; fa =2(  ) 1.
Therefore f 0 ¾0, f 00 =0, f 0
a >0, and f 00
a =0. Hence Proposition 4 is applicable. 
Even for this simple example, an analytical solution cannot be obtained. The nu-
merical algorithm can be outlined as follows.
 For each pair (a,), use conditions (i)–(iv) in Proposition C.1 to derive the trade
schedule x(;a,). Speciﬁcally, for    f ()=2fa() the solution can be derived
using (8). Otherwise, we need to numerically ﬁnd the critical point 0 given in
Lemma C.2 below which bunching occurs.
 Deﬁne two nonlinear equations of a and  by plugging x(,a,) into the seller’s
incentive constraint dR=da = 0 and the ﬁrst-order condition (v) in Proposi-
tion C.1. This is done by creating a function that calls the function x(,a,).
 Solve the two equations for a and . The trade schedule x(,a,) is then deter-
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I solve this example for  = 0.1 and for various values of the parameter k. The opti-
mal trade schedules are schematically illustrated in Figure 3.19 The shape of the optimal
trade schedule depends on the value of k in relation to two critical values, k0  0.012
and k1  0.068. The results illustrate the conclusions of Propositions 3 and 4 (refer to
the proof of Proposition 3 for the cutoff points of ).
 k >k1 =) f ()=2fa(), so there is full participation and full separation with
efﬁcient trade at both ends (Curve 2).
 k0 < k < k1 =)  f ()=2fa() <  <  f ()=fa(), so bunching occurs at the
bottom (Curve 3).
 k <k0 =)> f ()=fa(), so there is exclusion of trade (Curves 4 and 5).
 The optimal investment level a is inversely related to k.
It is interesting to note that the optimal trade schedule x is not monotonic in k.
And as k #0, curve x (line 5) is everywhere close to xE except at the very low end of the
type distribution, where x drops abruptly to zero. The idea is that as investment cost
becomes very low, it is possible to provide an incentive by punishing the seller only in
the very bad states; for all other states trade should be approximately efﬁcient.
6. Overinvestment
The holdup problem in this model is illustrated by the following result.
Observation. Let (a,x) be a solution to Program (P2) and let ae be the investment
choice that maximizes expected total surplus given the second-best trade schedule x. If
both ae and a are in the interior of A then a < ae, i.e. conditional on x the seller
underinvests.
The reason is simple and can be sketched as follows. By deﬁnition, ae satisﬁes
Z

[u(,x()) c(x())]fa(jae)d   g 0(ae)=0.






uFa(ja)d = g 0(a)
which implies Z

[u(,x()) c(x())]fa(ja)d   g 0(a)>0.
19The schedules are not monotonically stacked as predicted by Proposition 5 because investment is not
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By the concavity of the total surplus function, a <ae.
However, such a deﬁnite relation does not exist between a and the ﬁrst-best invest-










where v() is the rent paid to a type- buyer. Notice that the second-best contract cre-
ates two opposite effects on the seller’s incentive to invest. On the one hand, to elicit
truthfulrevelationatype- buyershouldbegivenrentv(),whichincreasesin. Hold-
ing constant the contract, this effect reduces the seller’s marginal return and hence dis-
courages investment. On the other hand, in the second-best contract trade is distorted
downward, especially for the low types. This reduces the total surplus and lowers the
seller’s payoff when types are low, which increases the seller’s marginal return and en-
courages investment. When the second effect is strong enough, the second-best invest-
ment level a can be greater than the ﬁrst-best level aE.
To illustrate this point explicitly, consider a simple version of the model in which the
buyer has only two types, 2 > 1, and the utility function of a buyer of type i is given
by u(i,x) = ix. Redeﬁning variables if necessary we can take the seller’s investment
choiceastheprobabilitythattype2 willoccur: p 2[0,1].20 Theinvestmentcostisgiven
by g(p) with g(0) = g 0(0) = 0, g 0 > 0, and g 00 > 0. The cost function c(x) satisﬁes c0 > 0,
c00 >0, c(0)=c0(0)=0, and c0(1)=1.
A constrained efﬁcient mechanism ((xi,ti),p) solves the program
max
xi,ti,p
p(2x2  c(x2))+(1 p)(1x1  c(x1))  g(p) subject to
ixi  ti ixj  tj, i,j =1,2
t2  t1 =c(x2) c(x1)+ g 0(p).
Let xE
i be the ﬁrst-best efﬁcient trade level for type i buyer and let pE be the ﬁrst-
best efﬁcient investment. The following proposition characterizes the constrained efﬁ-
cient mechanisms.
Proposition 6. Inanoptimalcontract,x2 =xE
2 and x1 <xE
1 . Furthermore,let A =2x1 
c(x1) and C = 1xE
1  c(xE
1 ). Then if A > C, there is underinvestment, p < pE; if A = C,
then p =pE; and if A <C, there is overinvestment, p >pE.
20Given an increasing probability function p(a) and cost function ^ g(a), one can deﬁne p as effort and a
new cost function g(p)= ^ g(a 1(p)).106 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Example 3. Assume 2 =2, 1 =1, c(x)=x2, and g(p)=kp2 where k >0. Note that the
ﬁrst-best efﬁcient trade levels are xE
i = i=2 for i = 1,2. It can be shown that there is a
cutoff for the parameter k: kc 0.5335 such that if k 2[0.5,kc), there is overinvestment;
if k > kc, there is underinvestment; and if k = kc, the investment level is ﬁrst-best
efﬁcient. 
To be sure, in the standard principal-agent model it is possible that the agent may
pickanactionlevelgreaterthantheonehewouldchooseintheabsenceoftheprincipal.
This is already pointed out by Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). However,
the reason that “overwork” may arise in the principal-agent model is because the agent
is risk averse and the principal can offer the agent partial insurance; if the agent is risk
neutral then the ﬁrst best can be achieved with or without the principal. In contrast,
in the current model, despite the fact that both agents are risk neutral towards income
the ﬁrst best is not achievable. The agent overinvests primarily because the screening of
buyertypescancreatefavorablemarginalreturnsoninvestmentfortheseller. Therefore
the sources of distortion in an agent’s action are different in the two models.
7. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a bilateral trade problem in which the seller makes hidden in-
vestment that inﬂuences the buyer’s hidden valuation, thus creating a holdup problem.
Underbroadconditionsitisimpossibleforbudget-balancedtradingmechanismstoim-
plement both ﬁrst-best efﬁcient investment and efﬁcient trade. I fully characterize the
constrained efﬁcient contracts. Compared with standard nonlinear pricing without a
holdup problem, the optimal trading schedule displays rigidity in the form of bunching
when the holdup problem is severe. In particular, bunching and exclusion of trade can
occur even if the distribution of buyer types satisﬁes the usual sorting conditions that
guarantee full separation in the standard nonlinear pricing models. Moreover, given the
investment level, as the holdup problem becomes more severe trade distortion relative
to the efﬁcient level becomes larger across the board for all buyer types.
Thispapercontributestotheliteraturebyconsideringarichmodelofbilateraltrade
with a holdup problem. It identiﬁes new sources and novel features of trade and in-
vestment distortions. As contract theorists are well aware, speciﬁc results in contract
theory are sensitive to the information and technological structures of the model. By
deriving implications of optimal contracting under alternative information and techno-
logical structures this paper takes a further step towards a better understanding of their
roles in real-world bilateral trade problems.
Appendix
A. The inefficiency theorem
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (xE(),t()) be a mechanism that implements aE. Since
aE is an interior point of A, the following ﬁrst-order condition holds:
Z 

[u(,xE()) c(xE())]dFa(,aE)= g 0(aE). (A.1)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 107
Similarly, incentive compatibility for the seller implies
Z 

[t() c(xE())]dFa(,aE)= g 0(aE). (A.2)




Namely, the marginal effect of investment on the buyer’s expected payoff is equal to




thus yielding a contradiction.
First, by Assumption 2, xE(0) > 0 and 00 > 0 imply xE(00) > 0. Therefore the set
 must be an interval [0,] for some 0 < andxE(0)0,xE()>0 for all  2(0,].
Deﬁne U()  u(,xE())   t(). Then the incentive constraint of the buyer and
Assumption 2 imply that for 00 > 0,
U(00)u(00,xE(0)) t(0)u(0,xE(0)) t(0)=U(0),
and the second inequality is strict if xE(0) > 0. Therefore the function U is strictly
increasing on the set  =[0,].
The distribution function F(,aE) has at most countably many jump discontinuities
at as many mass points. On the set [0,], divide every interval between two adjacent
mass points (including the end points 0,) further into sub-intervals of non-zero mea-
sures such that the function Fa(,aE) is either strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or
constant on the interior of each sub-interval; treat each mass point  as a single sub-
interval with its “monotonicity” determined by the sign of Fa(,aE)  Fa( ,aE). De-
note the sub-intervals by [0,1],...,[n,], where n 1.







“>” if 9[m 1,m],1m  j, on which Fa(,aE) is not constant.
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Equation (A.4) is shown by induction as follows. Consider j = 0. If 0 =  then the
resultistriviallytrue. Suppose0 >. Bydeﬁnition,xE()=0forall 2[,0]; thenthe







Now suppose (A.4) holds for j = 0,1,.... Consider j +1. Without loss of generality,
suppose Fa(,aE) is not constant on (j,j+1).





















The second inequality follows fromU(j+1)>U(j) and
R j
 dFa(,aE)0.


















where the second inequality follows fromU(j+1)>U(j) and
R j+1
 dFa(,aE)0.
The above argument proves (A.4), which in turn implies (A.3) and completes the
proof. 
B. Formulating program (P2)
The following characterization of the buyer’s incentive constraint ICB is standard (see
e.g. Guesnerie and Laffont 1984 or Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Theorem 7.3 for a proof).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 109
Lemma B.1. Suppose Assumptions 1–4 are satisﬁed. A piecewise differentiable schedule
(x,t) satisﬁes (ICB) if and only if (@ u=@ x)(dx=d)=dt=d and dx=d 0.
Let v()u(,x()) t() be the total utility that a type  buyer receives when she

































Substituting for v() and using integration by parts, we obtain the expression for R(a)
in (2) and arrive at Program (P2) in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. I ﬁrst show that the ﬁrst-order constraint is binding: R0(a) = 0.
Suppose to the contrary that the constraint is not binding. Then with the only active
constraints dx=d  0 and x()  0, an optimal solution x has to coincide with the
efﬁcient trade schedule: x() =xE() for all . It then follows from equation (C.1) that
R0(a)= g 00(a). Therefore R0(a)<0 for a >a, a contradiction.








Faa(,a)d   g 00(a).
By Proposition 2, x()xE() for all , which implies ux(,x()) c0(x())0 for all
. Since dx=d 0, Faa 0 (by CDFC), and g 00 0, it follows that R00(a)0.
Therefore any point a at which R0(a) = 0 is indeed a maximizer of R(a). Therefore
(x,a) satisﬁes the constraints of (P1), so it solves (P1).
Finally, any other allocation (x,a) with a > a that solves (P1) must yield the same
surplus as (x,a) does, so it must also solve (P2) because it is within the choice set of
(P2) and (x,a) solves (P2). 
C. Characterization results












d   g 0(a).110 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)












d   g 0(a). (C.1)
I prove the result via contradiction. Suppose x() > xE() for some . Since x
is continuous,21 there must exist 0 < 00 such that x() > xE() for all  2 (0,00),
x(0)¾xE(0) (“>” only if 0 =), and x(00)¾xE(00) (“>” only if 00 =).
Consider the following alternative trade schedule x deﬁned by: x() = xE() for
all  2 [0,00] and x() = x() otherwise. Since x is non-decreasing it follows that
x isalsonon-decreasing. Moreover, sincedx=d ¾0, Fa 0, andx()>xE()forall
 2(0,00), it follows from (C.1) that replacing x with x weakly relaxes the constraint
dR=da ¾ 0. Therefore (x,a) satisﬁes the constraints of (P2). Note that the expected
surplus is higher with this new contract because inefﬁcient trade is replaced by efﬁcient
trade on (0,00). This contradicts the optimality of solution (x,a). 
To reformulate Program (P2) as an optimal control problem, deﬁne a new state vari-








fa(,a)+u(,x)Fa(,a)  f (,a)g 0(a)

d. (C.2)
With the other two state variables x, a, and the control variable  = dx=d, Program















fa(,a)+u(,x())Fa(,a)  f (,a)g 0(a)
˙ a =0
¾0,x()¾0,k()=0,k()¾0.
Note that the constraint ˙ x = () ¾ 0 and boundary condition x() ¾ 0 ensure x() ¾ 0
for all .
Let , ,  be the costate variables associated with the state variables x, k, a respec-






+u(,x)Fa(,a)  f (,a)[g(a)+g 0(a)].
The following result characterizes the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a solution
to (Q).
21Recall that x is piecewise differentiable.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 111
Proposition C.1. If (x,a) is a solution to Program (Q) with a > a then there exist a








(iii) for all  2, ()¶0, dx=d ¾0, and ()(dx=d)=0
(iv) ¾0, dR(a)=da ¾0, and (dR(a)=da)=0
(v)
R 
 @ H(a)=@ a ¾0; “=0” if a <a.
Conversely, if there exist  and  such that conditions (i) - (iv) are satisﬁed then x is an
optimal path given a.
Conditions (i)–(iv) are the same as (6a)-(6d) in the text, reproduced here for conve-
nience. The necessity, which follows from the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, is rela-
tively standard. The sufﬁciency part, however, is not. The main complication is that the
Hamiltonian is not necessarily concave in x when f (,a)+fa(,a) < 0. As will be
seen below this possibility is not merely a technical nicety but rather has an important
relation with the severity of the holdup problem.
Proof. By the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, optimal paths x, k, a, and  satisfy
the following necessary conditions.




























Equation (C.3) is the optimization condition for the control variable . Equations (C.4)
to (C.9) are the laws of motion for x, k, a, , , and  respectively. The last three equa-
tions are the transversality conditions for , , and  respectively.112 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Since H is linear in , the optimization condition (C.3) implies condition (iii) of the
proposition. Conditions (i) and (ii) simply follow from (C.7) and (C.10). Since H does
not depend on k, (C.8) implies that  is constant. Then (C.11) implies (iv). Finally (v)
follows from (C.9) and (C.12).
As is standard, conditions (i)–(iv) are sufﬁcient for x, k, and  to be optimal given
a if the Hamiltonian H is concave in x, k, and . A simple inspection tells us that H is
indeed concave if f (,a)+fa(,a) ¾ 0. But this is not necessarily true for all ; so
we need to establish sufﬁciency explicitly.
Let x, , and  satisfy conditions (i)–(iv) of the proposition. Suppose f (,a) +
fa(,a)<0forsome. ThenbyMLRPthereexists ^  suchthat f (,a)+fa(,a)<0
for  < ^  and f (,a)+fa(,a)¾0 for  ¾ ^ . By Lemma C.1 below, we havex()=0
for all  2[, ^ ].
Now we show that any piecewise C1 schedule x that satisﬁes the constraints of Pro-
gram (Q) is dominated by x. By Proposition 2, we need only consider schedules sat-
isfying x ¶ xE (recall that xE is the ﬁrst-best schedule). The proof modiﬁes standard
arguments for sufﬁciency when the Hamiltonian H is concave in the state and control














be the alternative expected surpluses. To simplify notation, a is suppressed in the den-
sity and distribution functions. Let H be the Hamiltonian with the starred state and
control variables x, k, and , and let H be the Hamiltonian with variables x, k, and .
Then, since x =0 on [, ^ ], we have
































(H  ˙ x  ˙ k) (H  ˙ x  ˙ k)
©
d





















()x()+k() (^ )x(^ ) k(^ )
©
.
22See for example Leonard and Long (1992, Theorem 6.5.2 on page 213).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 113















(H  H)+ ˙ (x  x)
	
d
















(H  H)+ ˙ (x  x)
	
d.
Since the ﬁrst two terms are nonnegative, by the concavity of H on [^ ,] we have










completing the proof. 
Lemma C.1. If  >  f ()=fa() then x() = 0 for all  2 [, ^ ], where ^  satisﬁes
f (^ ,a)+fa(^ ,a)=0.
Proof. By MLRP, f (,a)+fa(,a) < 0 for  < ^  and f (,a)+fa(,a) > 0 for






Since  ¶ 0, this implies () < 0 for all  < ^ . Then by the complementary slackness
condition (6c), x is constant on [, ^ ]. Since x() = 0 by (6b), we have x() = 0 for all
 2[, ^ ]. 
Proof of Lemma 2. If there is no bunching at , then x is strictly increasing on the
interval (  ,) or (, +) or both for some small  > 0. By condition (iii) in Propo-
sition C.1, on an interval where dx=d > 0, costate variable  = 0, hence ˙  = 0. By
condition (i) this implies  @ H=@ x =0 on such an interval. By continuity, x() satisﬁes
the same equation. 
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove the efﬁciency at the top, let ^ x() be the trade level,
if it exists, that solves (7) at types where f +fa > 0. Note that ^ x() equals the efﬁcient
tradexE(). Supposetheoptimaltradex()<xE(). ThenbyLemma2bunchingmust
occur at . Let the optimal schedule x cross ^ x at some 1 <  so that x < ^ x at every
 2(1,]. We show thatx is not optimal, thus yielding a contradiction. Speciﬁcally, on
the interval (1,] replacex with ^ x. Then the total expected surplus is clearly increased114 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
since ^ x deviateslessfromtheefﬁcientscheduleon(1,]. Thenewscheduleisstillnon-
decreasing. Moreover, observe from (C.1) that the seller’s marginal return is increased
because the integrand was initially zero (dx=d = 0) but now becomes positive on the
interval(1,]. Thereforethenewschedulesatisﬁesalltheconstraintsandisbetterthan
x. This contradiction proves x()=xE().
Let  =  f ()=fa() be the inverse of the percentage change in f () following a
small change in investment. Then the rest of the results follow from these three state-
ments:
(a) if >, there is exclusion of trade for a range of the bottom types
(b) if =2<<, there is bunching at 
(c) if 0¶<=2, either x()=xE() or there is bunching at .
Part (a) follows directly from Lemma C.1.
Part (b): Suppose the statement is not true. Then by Lemma 2, x() satisﬁes (8).























where primes denote derivatives with respect to . Then the hypothesis =2 <  < 
implies
K 0()>1.
Combining this with the conditions K() = 0, uxx  c00(x) < 0, and ux > 0, we obtain
from (C.13) dx()=d <0, which is a contradiction.
Part (c): If there is no bunching at  then by Lemma 2, x() satisﬁes (8). Since
Fa()=0, (8) implies ux(,x()) c0(x())=0 and hence x()=xE(). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let 0   > 0. By Lemma C.1, at points (if any) where 1+
0(fa()=f ()) < 0, x(;0) = 0  x(;). Thus we need only consider points where
1+0(fa()=f ())>0. Note also that at such points 1+(fa()=f ())>0.
For a given >0, at each point where f ()+fa()>0 let ^ x(;) be the maximizer
of the Hamiltonian H. Note that when f ()+fa() > 0 the Hamiltonian H is strictly
concave in x; hence the maximizer ^ x() is either the unique x satisfying @ H=@ x = 0 or
is equal to zero.
We ﬁrst show that ^ x(;0)  ^ x(;) for 0 >  > 0. At points where (8) (i.e. @ H=@ x =
0) admits the unique solution ^ x(;), differentiate (8) with respect to :
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Since uxx(, ^ x) c00(^ x)<0, K 0, uxx 0, ux >0, and dK=d>0, we have d ^ x=d<
0. If (8) does not admit a solution, so that ^ x(;) = 0, then (8) also does not admit a
solution for 0 >, so ^ x(;0)=0. In conclusion, ^ x(;0) ^ x(;).
Since by Lemma 2 x(;) = ^ x(;) when there is no bunching at , it follows that
x(;0)x(;) whenever neither schedule involves bunching at .
Suppose x(0) > x() at some ˜ . Then one of the schedules is ﬂat at this point.
For types sufﬁciently close to , both x() and x(0) are strictly increasing and hence
x(0) < x(). Therefore x(0) must cross x() at some point 1 <  with x(;0) <
x(;)forall 2(1,). Moreover, oneofthefollowingcasesmustholdfortypesbelow
1.
Case (a): x(0) crosses x() at some 0 <1 with x(0)>x() on (0,1).
Case (b): x(0)>x() on interval [,1).
Consider case (a). Since x(0) increases at 0, by condition (iii) of Proposition C.1































which given (0;)  0 implies (1;) < 0. However, since x() increases at 1, the
complementary slackness condition (iii) implies (1;)=0, a contradiction.
For case (b), note that by condition (ii), x(;0) > x(;)  0 implies (;0) = 0.
The result then follows from the same argument for case (a) by taking 0 =. 
The following lemma is used to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma C.2. Let (x,a) be a solution to Program (Q) with a > a and let  and  be the
associated costate variables. Recall that K()= Fa()=(f ()+fa()). If K 0()<1 at
each point  where f ()+fa()>0 then either
(i) there is full participation and full separation of all types, or116 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(ii) there exists some 0, which may equal , such that there is exclusion of trade for























Proof. The solution satisﬁes the necessary conditions (i) - (iv) in Proposition C.1,
which we show imply the desired properties ofx. First, at points where f ()+fa()>
0, consider as before the schedule ^ x() determined by the equation @ H=@ x =0 or
ux  c0(x)=ux K(), (C.14)
where K() is deﬁned in (9) in the text. By the Implicit Function Theorem we can totally












By Assumption 8 and the conditions uxx   c00(x) ¶ 0, K ¾ 0, and dK=d < 1, (C.15)
implies d ^ x=d > 0. Therefore if (C.14) is solved by ^ x(0) ¾ 0 at some point 0 then it is
solved by ^ x()>0 for all  >0 and ^ x is strictly increasing at those points.
Case 1: f ()+fa()>0. Then MLRP implies f ()+fa()>0 for all . Therefore
^ x is deﬁned for every  and is strictly increasing. By Lemma 2, if the solution x differs
from ^ x at some point then it is ﬂat around the point. Therefore given that ^ x is strictly
increasing if x() < ^ x() then x is constant on [,] and if x() > ^ x() then x is
constant on [,]. The former is impossible as it violates efﬁciency at the top. The latter
implies that x is greater than efﬁcient trade xE at points near , which is impossible by
Proposition 2. In conclusion, x = ^ x and x()=xE() for  =,.
Case 2: f ()+fa() < 0. Then by MLRP there exists some ^  2 (,) below which
K() < 0, above which K() > 0, and for which K(^ ) = 1. Let 0 = inff > ^  : ^ x() ¾
0 solves (C.14)g. Then the schedule ^ x is strictly increasing on [0,] with ^ x(0) = 0 and
^ x()=xE(). We need to show only that x = ^ x on [0,], as monotonicity then implies
x = 0 on [,0]. Recall that x is ﬂat whenever x 6= ^ x. Hence, if x > ^ x  0 at some
00  0, then x(^ ) = x(00) > 0, which contradicts Lemma C.1. On the other hand, if
x < ^ x at some 00 0, thenx is constant on [00,], violating efﬁciency at the top. The
desired result then follows.
















and the boundary value ux(,0) c0(0). If (C.14) admits a solution ^ x()  0 at the point
 then x = ^ x for all  and only in this nongeneric case we may have x() < xE() andTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 117
no bunching at . Otherwise, let 0 = inff : ^ x() ¾ 0 solves (C.14)g; then arguments
similar to the ones in Case 2 imply x =0 on [,0] and x = ^ x on (0,]. This completes
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Again let  =  f ()=fa(). Then the proposition follows
from the following three statements.
(a) If 0¶¶=2 then there is full participation and separation with x()=xE().
(b) If >  then there is some 0 such that x = 0 on [,0] and there is participation
and full separation on (0,].
(c) If =2 <  ¶  then there is some 0 ¾  such that x() = x() ¾ 0 for  2 [,0]
and there is full separation on (0,].
(a) We need only the assumption f 0 > 0 for this part. First note that f +fa > 0 for all





Fa(f 0 +f 0
a)
(f +fa)2 (C.16)









a f   fa f 0
f 2 >0
and hence f 0
a > fa f 0=f , which together with f 0 >0 and f +fa >0 implies
f 0 +f 0















The result then follows from Lemma C.2.
(b) Deﬁne A()= Fa(f 0 +f 0
a)  fa(f +fa). Then whenever f +fa 0, we have
A0()= Fa(f 00 +f 00
a )  f 0
a(f +fa)¶0. (C.18)
From (C.16), we have
K 0()=





Let ^  be the point where f +fa = 0. Since f 0 +f 0
a  0 by (C.17), at the point ^  we
have








which together with (C.18) and (C.19) implies A()  0 and K 0()  0 for all   ^ . The
result then follows from Lemma C.2.118 Rui R. Zhao Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
(c) If  =  then by the preceding argument, A() ¶ 0 and hence K 0()  0 for all
. Thus by Lemma C.2 either there is full participation and full separation or there is
some 0 below which there is no trade and above which there is participation and full
separation.
If =2<< then f ()+fa()>0 for all , which by (C.18) implies that A0()0
for all . Since A() and K 0() have the same sign and A() > 0, it follows that there is
some  2 (,) such that K 0()  0 for    and K 0()  0 for   . Now (C.19)
together with A0()0 and f 0 +f 0





it follows that there exists some ^    below which K 0()  1 and above which
K 0()  1. Then the pointwise maximizer of the Hamiltonian, ^ x(), is decreasing on
[, ^ ] and is nondecreasing on [^ ,]. “Ironing” this U-shaped schedule then implies
that the optimal solution x involves exactly one bunching region at the bottom, which
is the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 6. First substitute the last constraint into the incentive con-
straints to obtain
2x2  2x1 c(x2) c(x1)+ g 0(p) (C.20)
1x1  1x2  c(x2)+c(x1)  g 0(p). (C.21)
I show that in an optimal solution the constraint (C.21) is not binding.
Suppose both (C.21) and (C.20) are binding. Then x2 = x1 and p = 0. The optimal
solution has to be x2 = x1 = xE
1 . However, this solution is dominated by (xE
i ,p) where




1 )+ g 0(p).
Suppose(C.21)isbindingand(C.20)isnot. Considertwocases. Case1: x1 6=xE
1 . One
can change x1 slightly toward xE
1 to some x0
1 so that (C.20) is intact and 1x0
1  c(x0
1) >
1x1  c(x1). Hence constraint (C.21) is relaxed and the value of the objective function
is increased, which is impossible. Case 2: x1 = xE
1 . Then the only way for (C.21) to be
binding is to have x2 = xE
1 and p = 0, which apparently is not optimal. Thus (C.21)
cannot be binding.
Next we show that the optimal solution must have x2 = xE
2 . If not, one can slightly
change x2 toward xE
2 , which increases total surplus without violating any constraint.










2 )2x1  c(x1)+ g 0(p). (C.22)
Let 0 be the multiplier on (C.22). The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(1 p)(1  c0(x1))(2  c0(x1)) (“=” if x1 >0) (C.23)
2xE
2  c(xE
2 ) (1x1  c(x1))= g 0(p)+g 00(p). (C.24)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup 119
Suppose  = 0. Then by (C.23), x1 = xE
1 . But (C.22) and (C.24) imply that 2x1  
1x1 = 0, which is impossible. Therefore  > 0 (hence (C.22) is binding). Note also that
xE
2 must be strictly greater than x1 for otherwise 2  c0(x1) = 0, which is inconsistent
with (C.23). It follows that 2  c0(x1) > 0. Since  > 0 it follows from (C.23) that 1  
c0(x1)>0. Thus x1 <xE
1 .
To prove the latter half of the proposition, simply note that pE and the second-best





1 )]= g 0(pE)
2xE
2  c(xE
2 ) [2x1  c(x1)]= g 0(p). 
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